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Book Reviews 
FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES 
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH. By Kent Greenawalt. 1 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. 189. 
Hardcover, $29.95. 
Michael E. Rosmanz 
In Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties 
Of Speech, Kent Greenawalt surveys a number of different free 
speech issues all of which revolve around a common question: 
What happens when a person's expression, through words or 
deeds, significantly disturbs another person or persons? The 
traditional civil libertarian answer to this question (with few ex-
ceptions) has been simple: Tough luck to those who are dis-
turbed. But the traditional civil libertarian response has come 
under increasing attack in recent years both by those who per-
ceive free speech as a means by which the dominant classes in 
society can continue to subjugate the rest, forestalling true equal-
ity, and by those who believe that dissident or iconoclastic ex-
pression should not undermine our traditional societal values. 
It is to Mr. Greenawalt's credit that he sees the connection 
between hate speech and flag burning, workplace harassment 
and nude dancing, obscenity and campus speech codes.3 He cov-
1. Professor of Law. Columbia University. 
2. General Counsel. Center For Individual Rights, Washington. D.C. B.A. 1981. 
University of Rochester; J.D. 1984, Yale Law School. The Center For Individual Rights is 
a public interest law firm that has represented plaintiffs in various First Amendment 
cases, including Rosenberger 1·. Rector and Visitors of che Uni1-ersity of Virginia. 115 S. Ct. 
2510 (1995); lora Xi Chapcer of Sigma Chi Fracernicy v. George Mason Universicy, 993 F.2d 
386 (4th Cir. 1993): and Silva v. Universicy of New Hampshire. 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 
1994). 
Eugene Volokh. Michael McDonald. and Hans Bader all reviewed drafts of this re· 
view and provided me with insightful comments and thoughts. as did my editor, Michael 
Paulsen. I thank them. but take full responsibility for the various flaws that appear 
herein. 
3. As he explains in the Preface, the book was based on four separate lectures that 
Mr. Greenawalt gave concerning hate speech, flag burning, a comparison of Canadian 
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ers all of these areas well; although lawyers have a tendency to 
overestimate the accessibility of writing on legal issues, I think 
the discussions can be followed by the average layperson, but will 
not bore the First Amendment specialist. (I fall somewhere in 
between.) Mr. Greenawalt also provides a comparison to Cana-
dian rulings on similar First Amendment issues,4 and tries to de-
velop a theme (which I discuss briefly in Part III of this review) 
in the beginning and at the end of the book that emphasizes con-
sideration of "communities" in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Mr. Greenawalt is a professor of law at Columbia Law 
School. Even if the jacket (which provides that information) of 
my copy of the book had somehow been misplaced, it would not 
have been a difficult thing to guess. His analysis is thorough, 
well-reasoned, and moderate. He sees many sides to the ques-
tions. He is concerned that the Supreme Court did not pay suffi-
cient attention to interests being served by the Congressional flag 
burning statute, struck down in United States v. Eichman,s inter-
ests that differed from those served by the Texas flag-burning 
statute struck down in Texas v. Johnson.6 (He thinks Eichman 
was correctly decided, mind you. It's just that the Court could 
have been more sensitive in its analysis.) He gives full considera-
tion to each varying effort to defend hate speech laws, even some 
that probably do not merit such attention. His analysis of work-
place harassment is so evenhanded, and so thorough in discussing 
the pro's and con's of each separate argument, that I am still not 
sure what his position is even after reading it several times. Fi-
nally, as I discuss shortly, his analysis frequently reflects the val-
ues of the class of which Columbia Law School professors are a 
part. 
and United States law, and the role that individuals and communities play in free speech 
issues. 
4. Although I found it quite interesting, I will not dwell upon Mr. Greenawalt's 
discussion of Canadian law. Under the Canadian charter, virtually all forms of expression 
are considered free speech. But under Section 1 of that document, fundamental freedoms 
are subject "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society." Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Com-
munities and Liberties of Speech 13 (Princeton U. Press, 1995). The Canadian legislature 
can make a specific declaration that Section 1 is applicable to a certain piece of legislation 
or, even without that declaration, a court can declare that the limitation on freedom is 
"reasonable." Id. at 13. What all of this means, in essence, is that Canadian courts en-
gage in far more "balancing" tests than do courts in the United States, which are either 
hamstrung or properly constrained (depending upon one's viewpoint) by categorical 
rules. 
5. 496 U.S. 310,318-19 (1990). 
6. 491 u.s. 397, 418-20 (1989). 
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In Part I of this review, I consider Professor Greenawalt's 
analysis of hate speech and workplace harassment rules. In Part 
II, I look specifically at Professor Greenawalt's analysis of cam-
pus speech codes, and more generally at his efforts to consider 
more closely the role that government is playing in each different 
free speech context, an idea that I liked and wished he had devel-
oped more fully. Finally, in Part III, I briefly examine his analy-
sis of the "individuals" and "communities" that are included in 
the subtitle of his book and conclude-as I think Professor 
Greenawalt does himself-that they are, at best, of only modest 
use in considering free speech issues. 
I 
In discussing what is loosely characterized as "hate 
speech" -the pernicious and derogatory use of bigoted epithets 
or symbols-Professor Greenawalt begins, as he should, with 
"fighting words. "7 Greenawalt wants to expand the definition of 
"fighting words" so as to include words which are designed to 
humiliate and which would be an invitation to fight to the "aver-
age" person. Thus, even if racial taunts are slung towards small 
African-American children by large white adults, Greenawalt 
considers them "fighting words" through an "equalization of vic-
tim" principle.s Greenawalt's admitted purpose is to separate 
the "fighting words" doctrine from its roots as a First Amend-
ment exception designed only to avoid actual violence, and to 
broaden it to include words that are intended to, and which gen-
erally do, inflict deep psychological hurt. 
The "equalization of victim" principle sounds interesting, 
although, as Greenawalt concedes, it is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court decision in Gooding v. Wilson,9 and stretches the 
rationale for prohibiting this type of speech to the point where 
7. Greenawalt characterizes "fighting words," in the traditional sense of words 
likely to incite violence, as part of a category outside the First Amendment he calls "situa-
tion-altering" communications-a useful category, even if I did not always agree with 
Greenawalt's application of it. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 48 (cited in note 4). "Situ-
ation-altering" communications are more a commitment to action than an expression of 
facts or values. Thus. two people who agree to commit a crime have engaged in a situa-
tion-altering communication; even though the agreement may have been effected through 
spoken words, it has no First Amendment protection. Since Greenawalt likens "fighting 
words" to an invitation to a fight, he believes that they, too, are "situation-altering." !d. 
8. Id. at 53. 
9. 405 U.S. 518, 526, 528 (1972) (conviction based on Georgia statute proscribing 
"opprobrious words or abusive language" set aside; Georgia courts had unconstitutionally 
permitted the statute to be applied where there was no likelihood "that the person ad-
dressed would make an immediate violent response"). See Greenawalt, Fighting Words 
at 163 n.28 (cited in note 4). 
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placing it under the "fighting words" rubric is a bit misleading. 
Greenawalt also recognizes two more serious problems. First, 
the use of "hate speech" carries some expressive value with it, 
even if the "messages" are ones of racial or ethnic inferiority that 
most of us would find distasteful. Second, an "intent to humili-
ate" will frequently be difficult to discern, particularly if it must 
be the sole motivation for the speech.to Greenawalt suggests that 
we limit a civil prohibition to "targeted vilification," where the 
speaker has sought out the victim and initiated contact for the 
purpose of humiliation and insult, much like laws prohibiting 
harassing telephone calls.11 
Of course, there is the little matter of R.A. V. v. City of St. 
Pau/,12 in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that a sim-
ilar law did not pass Constitutional muster. A five-person major-
ity held that, even assuming that the municipal ordinance in that 
case precluding the use of "hate speech" involved only "fighting 
words," it created improper distinctions between "fighting 
words" which discriminated on the basis of viewpoint (permit-
ting minorities to yell "fascist" and "Nazi" at their enemies, but 
not allowing those yelled at to respond in kind) and content (not 
reaching other fighting words because they are not insults based 
on race, ethnicity, or another forbidden characteristic).J3 A four-
person minority found the statute unconstitutional simply be-
cause it reached beyond the "fighting words" category to pro-
tected speech. As the foregoing discussion should make plain, 
however, Greenawalt simply disagrees with both groups of jus-
tices; with the minority because they do not have a sufficiently 
expansive notion of "fighting words," and with the majority for 
using "strict scrutiny" to assess a statute which reached words 
with little expressive value. The intent to vilify or "humiliate" a 
10. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 53 (cited in note 4) ("[L]ine-drawing problems 
are severe. The speaker's motives may be mixed, and separating an intent to humiliate 
from an honest but vulgar statement of views is often difficult.") 
11. Greenawalt likens this proposed rule to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, although that tort usually requires more than a mere intent to humiliate. 
!d. at 54-55. Indeed, Greenawalt suggests that a law prohibiting "targeted vilification" 
using epithets could both stand as "symbolic statements" to our values and perhaps re-
lieve plaintiffs from establishing all of the elements of the more general tort. ld. at 47. 
12. 505 u.s. 377 (1992). 
13. Greenawalt suggests that "some abusive expressions hurt so generally in face-to-
face conversations that they should be singled out," and specifically identifies racial and 
ethnic epithets and slurs as the best candidates. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 55 (cited 
in note 4). This seems a far more complicated question than Greenawalt's discussion 
suggests. Some people, at least, might feel far more pain when their physical handicap, 
obesity, or intelligence are derided in abusive terms. If "hurtful words" are placed 
outside the First Amendment, a law which deals with a particular subset is liable to rely 
upon arbitrary line-drawing and to be underinclusive. 
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private citizen, according to Greenawalt, is sufficient to take 
speech outside of the carapace of the First Amendment. 14 
There is, of course, a rather obvious irony in a law professor 
suggesting that words spoken with an intent to humiliate are enti-
tled to little or no Constitutional protection. Perhaps we should 
consider laws which focus on excesses in the use of Socratic dia-
logue and "targeted humiliation" within law schools. No doubt 
Greenawalt would state that such speech is different; it has a di-
dactic purpose and, consequently, a public importance. I would 
agree. But that only reflects who Greenawalt and I (and, pre-
sumably, most of the readers of this review) are: people who 
would never use the kind of epithets that were the subject of the 
statute in St. Paul and who would be the target of a Greenawalt 
hypothetical statute, people who simply do not believe in the un-
derlying messages that such epithets convey. On the other hand, 
people who would use such epithets-to, for example, "brow-
beat" minorities back towards their "proper" place of subservi-
ence in our country-might wonder why it is necessary to 
publicly humiliate law students in front of their classmates. 
In short, our understanding of what is "valuable" speech 
(even with an intent to humiliate) tends to reflect our own back-
grounds and values. And that is precisely the opposite of what a 
value-neutral First Amendment requires, and precisely why we 
employ categorical rules when analyzing regulations of speech. I 
do not mean to suggest that Professor Greenawalt is ultimately 
wrong with respect to his targeted vilification proposal; only that 
we must be very careful about adopting arguments that certain 
kinds of expression are less valuable than others. 
Professor Greenawalt's discussion of workplace harassment 
also reflects his values. Although this is an area which has been 
well-trod by others,Is Professor Greenawalt starts by posing the 
right choice: either the workplace setting provides support for 
censorship which the government does not otherwise possess, or 
workplace harassment rules are inconsistent with fundamental 
14. ld. at 53-54. 
15. See Kingsley R. Browne. Title VI/ as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harass-
ment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 481 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Workplace Harassment. 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791 (1992); Suzanne Sangree, Title 
VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amend-
ment: No Collision In Sight, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 461 (1995); Eugene Volokh, How Harass-
ment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 563 (1995); Kingsley R. Browne, 
Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 579 (1995): 
Suzanne Sangree. A Reply to Professors Volokh And Browne, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 595 
(1995); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harass-
ment Cases. 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1009 (1996). 
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First Amendment freedoms. Moreover, he does a fairly good job 
of going through the various arguments that support the proposi-
tion that the government can censor speech in the workplace that 
it otherwise cannot. He, quite properly I think, rejects arguments 
based upon the special nature of the workplace, a "captive audi-
ence" rationale, or the suggestion that restrictions of workplace 
speech constitute a "time, place or manner" restriction.16 He 
spends time discussing the possibility that speech itself can some-
times discriminate, although I do not think this constitutes a par-
ticularly difficult or significant problem.11 
Ultimately, though, Professor Greenawalt relies primarily 
on another "low value" argument to support government regula-
tion of workplace speech that is both crude and intended to de-
mean or humiliate. Such speech-very much like his "targeted 
vilification" speech in discussing "hate speech"-is properly 
regulable, according to Greenawalt, with only a minimal showing 
of need by the government. But he goes further here and sug-
gests that (1) repetitious, personally-directed speech in the face 
of a complaint by the recipient is punishable just as one might 
16. Professor Greenawalt does employ "captive audience" analysis to justify regula-
tion of a very specific problem. viz .. the situation where the recipient of directed, personal 
speech has told the speaker that (s)he prefers not to hear it. He appears to reject a 
"captive audience" analysis for overheard conversations. calendars on the wall, and other, 
more run-of-the-mill harassment situations. Greenawalt. Fighting Words at 86-87 (cited 
in note 4). 
17. Professor Greenawalt's example of "speech that discriminates" is a supervisor 
telling a female employee that she should not apply for a job because it will not go to a 
woman. ld. at 84. While I think that Professor Greenawalt's characterization of such 
speech as "situation altering" is correct, it deserves mention that speech of this kind is 
usually treated by the courts as a form of commercial speech, both entitled to less protec-
tion in general and regulable when (like a prostitute's "speech" offering her services) it is 
related to an illegal activity. E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (sex-segregated want ads not protected by 
First Amendment where it relates to illegal sex discrimination in hiring); Ragin v. The 
New York Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991) 
(all-white advertisements sufficiently related to illegal housing sales to eliminate any First 
Amendment protection). Liability for the speech in Greenawalt's example, then. also 
could be justified on the ground that it is commercial speech related to an illegal commer-
cial transaction (viz., a sexually-discriminatory promotion). 
I have previously argued that the Supreme Court has not defined with sufficient 
specificity how commercial speech must "relate" to an illegal transaction for its First 
Amendment protection to disappear. See Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity and the First 
Amendment: Some Thoughts On All-White Advertising, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 289, 346 (1993). 
Using the broadest description the Court has used for this unprotected category-<:om-
mercial speech that "concerns" an illegal transaction-one could argue that other kinds of 
workplace speech (e.g., sexist speech by an employer) might be commercial speech suffi-
ciently related to an illegal commercial "transaction," viz., disparate treatment in a con-
tinuing employer-employee relationship. Personally, I think this is far too broad a 
conception for "commercial" speech, but it cannot be said that current Supreme Court 
doctrine on commercial speech eliminates this defense of regulating workplace speech. 
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punish the "speech" of someone on the street who refuses to 
honor a request by someone else to be left alone and (2) even 
crude speech not intended to humiliate or intimidate (like crude 
sexual innuendo or the display of pornography) should be regu-
lated on a showing of something less than "compelling need" be-
cause it is "low value" speech.1s I pass over the first situation 
because Greenawalt is probably right in his analysis, and wrong 
in suggesting that such situations constitute any significant por-
tion of workplace harassment claims based upon speech. 19 
The second category (crude innuendo, pornographic calen-
dars, and the like) warrants closer attention. Greenawalt very 
tentatively characterizes such speech as "low value,"2o but it is 
far less clear than he suggests that the Supreme Court recognizes 
such a category. The Court occasionally has referred to the idea 
of low-value speech but, outside of the "fighting words" context, 
it has not upheld a content-based restriction of low-value speech, 
and it seems unlikely to do so after R.A. V21 
More importantly, the new "low value" category Greena-
walt suggests raises two additional problems. First, as I have al-
ready mentioned, using concepts like "low value" speech is a 
dangerous thing. We have a grave tendency to identify modes of 
communication that others use as "low value," and the modes 
that we use as "high value."22 Expressing sexual desire in a 
18. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 87-88 (cited in note 4). 
19. See Volokh, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 1839 n.219 (cited in note 15). 
20. He is not completely consistent. At first, he states that "[a] plausible claim of 
'low value' speech for [crude] comments ... must rest not alone on crudeness and offen-
siveness but on the purpose to demean." Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 88 (cited in note 
4). Two pages later, however. he states that speech other than that designed to humiliate, 
including "[p]rovocative nude calendars" and "crude sexual innuendo" may also "be 
deemed of low value." !d. at 90. I take it that Greenawalt may have various levels of 
"low value" speech in mind, some of which require only a minimal showing of govern-
mental need, and others of which require some middle-level scrutiny which Greenawalt 
does not define very well. 
21. Greenawalt mentions two cases, Young v. American Mini Theatres. Inc., 427 U.S. 
50 (1976) and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Greenawalt. 
Fighting Words at 104, 173 n.20 (cited in note 4). Both cases involved the zoning of adult 
movie theatres and, in each instance, the Court upheld restrictions not based upon the 
content of the communication, but rather based upon the "secondary effects" which the 
speech ostensibly involved. On the other hand, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205 (1975), the Court struck down an ordinance which precluded drive-in theatres 
from showing movies with nudity, the "low value" of such movies notwithstanding. !d. at 
209 ("when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public 
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the 
First Amendment strictly limits its power"). 
22. See Volokh, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 1856-57 (cited in note 15). In his most recent 
article, Professor Volokh notes the various occasions in which public art involving nudity, 
including a showing of Goya's Naked Maja, has been the basis of sexual harassment 
claims. Volokh, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1016 (cited in note 15). I submit that those who find 
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crude way (as opposed to a polite, refined, and repressed way) 
may or may not be less effective (a point on which I express no 
opinion), but it is hardly less expressive. Indeed, one would 
think quite the opposite. When we suggest that one form of com-
munication is better than another, we are simply imposing our 
own upper-middle-class, elite-school values on Constitutional 
doctrine.z3 
Second, Professor Greenawalt has not really answered the 
question that he asked at the outset of his discussion on work-
place harassment, viz., why should protection of speech in the 
workplace be any less than protection outside of the workplace? 
He rejects the traditional justifications for a difference in treat-
ment that most advocates of workplace harassment rules use. He 
believes targeted harassment, either through repetition or 
through an intent to humiliate, should be without protection in 
both the workplace and on the street. To the extent he believes 
that a lower level of scrutiny should apply to other kinds of "low 
value" speech, he seems to rely on a (somewhat questionable) 
"low value" doctrine used by the Court outside of the workplace. 
His unstated conclusion should be, I think, the other possibility 
he mentioned at the outset of his discussion: that "the law of 
workplace harassment is out-of-kilter with general First Amend-
ment doctrine. "24 
such claims distinguishable from sexual harassment claims based on pictures from Play-
boy and Penthouse are simply imposing their own personal conception of "art"' on the 
law. 
23. Cf. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting Of America 8, 130 (The Free Press, 1990); 
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, 1. dissenting) ("When the Court 
takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and 
more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class 
from which the Court's Members are drawn."). 
24. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 81 (cited in note 4). Greenawalt goes on to assert 
that even fully-protected speech can be considered as contributing to a hostile environ-
ment so long as there is other unprotected speech or conduct which also has contributed 
to that environment-even if the unprotected speech or conduct alone would nor have been 
sufficient to constitute a hostile environment. !d. at 96. To say the least, I find this idea 
disturbing and wholly inconsistent with standard Supreme Court doctrine. If a state or 
federal employer. for example, were to base an adverse employment decision in part on 
unprotected speech or conduct, and in part on protected speech, it would have the burden 
of showing that it would have made the same decision without considering the protected 
speech. Mr. Healthy Bd. Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Greenawalt offers no 
reason why the same standard should not apply to a federal or state law which covers 
both protected speech and other unprotected conduct or speech. Cf. Street v. New York, 
394 U.S. 576, 587 (1969) ("we are still bound to reverse if the conviction could have been 
based upon both [defendant's] words and his act.") (emphasis in original); id. at 588 (re-
versal necessary "unless the record negates the possibility that the conviction was based 
on both alleged violations"); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,918 (1982) 
("While the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent con-
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II 
In regulating speech among and between citizens, either in-
side or outside the workplace, the government acts in its role as 
sovereign. In the modern age of expansive government, though, 
government has many roles aside from that of treating citizens 
qua citizens. Should the role the government plays affect its abil-
ity to restrict speech? Should the government that can put peo-
ple in jail be more constrained than the government that sells 
advertising spacezs or the government that operates public high 
schools or the government that operates public universities? 
At least in some cases, the Supreme Court certainly thinks 
so and has so held when government as employer restricts the 
speech of its employees.26 Indeed, the fact that a government 
employee receives any protection for his speech from the First 
Amendment represents a step up from accepted doctrine in the 
nineteenth century, which was that government employees "may 
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but [they] ha[ve] no 
constitutional right to be [government employees]."z7 Today, to 
put the doctrine very roughly, a government employer can act in 
the same fashion that a typical and reasonable, viewpoint-neutral 
private employer would acvs 
Greenawalt quite properly notes that when a government 
promulgates a campus speech code for its state-run universities, 
it is acting in a different role than when it promulgates statutes 
against "hate speech." Violation of rules against "hate speech" 
or "workplace harassment" can result in criminal penalties and 
civil damages, i.e., a restriction on one's freedom or a taking of 
one's property. Those who violate campus codes will simply 
have their status as students affected. Moreover, students at-
duct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent protected 
activity."). 
25. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding general rule 
prohibiting political advertising); Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
(Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). 
26. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994) ("even many of the most funda-
mental maxims of our First Amendment jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied to 
speech by government employees."). The Court noted that while citizens may have the 
right to wear a jacket in a courtroom which said "Fuck the draft," it "ha[s] never ex-
pressed doubt that a government employer may bar its employees from using [that] offen-
sive utterance to members of the public, or to the people with whom they work." !d. 
27. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). 
28. "Viewpoint-neutral," that is, with respect to things outside of its business. IBM 
need not be viewpoint-neutral about the future of computers, for example, and presuma-
bly might fire a Luddite employee publicly advocating their mass destruction. So, too, a 
governmental employer can fire an employee for speech which disrupts the workplace or 
undermines its mission. 
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tending state-operated public universities receive significant state 
subsidies for their education. If a state wishes to promote the 
"civic virtues" or civil discourse, it may have a reasonable inter-
est in seeing that state monies are not used to undermine those 
goals.z9 
Thus, while it certainly cannot be said anymore that a stu-
dent at a public university, who is punished for his speech, has a 
right to free speech, but no right to be a publicly-subsidized stu-
dent, it does seem that the government's role as an educator is 
different than its role as sovereign. Certainly, this is true at the 
secondary school level.3o And while universities and colleges 
usually do not have the same concern with the civic and moral 
development of their students as high schools do, I am unaware 
of any Constitutional principle which precludes them from taking 
any interest. Greenawalt notes that "what is right for Columbia 
or Stanford may not be right for Brigham Young or Liberty Bap-
tist College;"3J but the same is true of public universities. What 
is right for the University of South Carolina may not be right for 
the Citadel.32 The few lower court cases that have considered 
campus speech codes cited free speech precedents wherein the 
government was acting in its role as sovereign, and did not give 
any special consideration to the government's role as educator.33 
Professor Greenawalt suggests that "courts should look not 
only to the concept of government as regulator of citizens but 
29. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
30. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,685 (1986) (school could constitution-
ally punish a student for making a tongue-in-cheek campaign speech at a school assem-
bly). Greenawalt characterizes this decision as "highly questionable" (Greenawalt, 
Fighting Words at 59 (cited in note 4)), but I did not understand him to dispute the gen-
eral proposition that high school students do not have the full panoply of free speech 
rights that citizens do. 
31. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 75 (cited in note 4). 
32. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (government given greater freedom 
to restrict speech of members of the armed services). 
33. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); UWM Post v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E. D. Wis. 
1991). The Supreme Court, on occasion, also has given short shrift to any special role the 
State may have as educator. E.g., Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Mis-
souri, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (enjoining the expulsion of a student who distributed a 
newspaper with a picture of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of 
Justice; "the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a 
state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of 
decency'."). 
Greenawalt is concerned about R.A. V. and its application to campus speech codes 
(Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 76 (cited in note 4)), but if the government's role as an 
employer permits it to fire employees who use racial epithets-and surely it does under 
some circumstances (see, e.g., Manin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583,586 (5th Cir. 1986))-it is at 
least possible that the government's role as educator permits it to punish students who do 
so, despite R.A. V. 
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also to the concept of government as employer, in order to un-
derstand the proper relation of a state university to its stu-
dents. "34 I would put it more simply: perhaps the courts should 
try to understand the unique role of the state as educator, and 
the particular mission that a particular state institution is trying 
to accomplish. If my rough shorthand description of what a gov-
ernment qua employer can do is correct, perhaps government 
qua public universities should be allowed to restrict speech to the 
same extent that a reasonable and typical, viewpoint-neutral pri-
vate university with a similar mission would. This standard con-
strains government regulation of speech more than the 
government-as-employer standard would, although it might 
change over time as universities do; but it would not place public 
universities at a grave disadvantage in effecting their "missions" 
viz a viz private universities. At this time in our history, more-
over, this standard, I believe, is not all that different from the 
resolution that Greenawalt reaches, which would permit campus 
speech codes to preclude directed verbal harassment of other stu-
dents, but require the protection of honest expressions of opinion 
no matter how offensive.3s 
This would not save most modern campus speech codes. For 
the most part, they are not viewpoint-neutral and do not protect 
honest expressions of opinion. Moreover they are, in many in-
stances, intolerably vague and overbroad. Indeed, perhaps the 
one common flaw in Greenawalt's analysis of both workplace 
harassment and campus speech codes is his failure to recognize 
this, and his insistence that instances in which protected expres-
sion is implicated by these rules are rare and unusual.36 They are 
not. Indeed, with both Title VII and Title IX now permitting 
compensatory and punitive damages for the victims of harass-
ment (as well as permitting attorneys' fees for the successful 
plaintiff; but not, in general, for the successful defendant), plain-
tiffs and their lawyers have every reason to push the harass-
ment envelope.37 Without any significant First Amendment 
34. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 98 (cited in note 4). 
35. !d. 
36. E.g., id. at 92. 
37. Rick Meyer, Boon For Lawyers (Letter To The Editor), Washington Post A26 
(May 24, 1996) (noting increase of complaints to EEOC from 6,100 in 1990 to 15,549 in 
1995, and noting that a significant legal change during that time was the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991). Cf. DeAngelis v. £1 Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass'n, 51 
F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 473 (1995) Qury awards plaintiff 
$10,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages for hostile environ-
ment created by articles written in union newsletter; judgment reversed on appeal). 
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limit on the size of that envelope, I have little doubt that they 
will.3s 
III 
In his penultimate chapter, Professor Greenawalt discusses 
how a consideration of "communities" might affect Constitu-
tional analysis of various important First Amendment issues. 
Unfortunately, Greenawalt finds it difficult to define what a com-
munity is apd never quite explains why judges (as opposed to, for 
example, legislators) should be weighing these values. 
Greenawalt insists that there are communities smaller than 
"all of society" or the "polity" which are deserving of our consid-
eration and attention (although he specifically refuses to focus 
upon whether local levels of government might be, or represent, 
a "community").39 He specifically cites cultural or religious 
groups that supply a strong sense of self-identification, like the 
Amish, but also wants to employ the term to include both units 
as small as families and collectives as large as "women."4o It is a 
"functional" definition, he tells us, but the independent variables 
of this particular function remain murky. 
Once we find a "community," what exactly should we do 
with it? If a men's club could prove that it was a "community," 
would that give it an extra claim to a right of association that 
permitted it to exclude women? Well, not exactly. Greenawalt 
concedes that "[n]ongovernmental associations may be contexts 
of unfairness, domination, even coercion," and agrees that inter-
vention to rectify such unfairness "is often appropriate." But, on 
the other hand, that intervention must be "carefully calibrated to 
the kind of association that is involved" and "(s ]ometimes the 
38. Greenawalt concedes that the standards "are undoubtedly vague and open· 
ended," but nonetheless "about as precise as the subject allows." Id. I am unaware of 
any First Amendment doctrine which holds that vague laws are constitutional because 
clarity is impossible. In any event, the vagueness problem on college campuses is exacer-
bated far more than it needs to be by the haphazard and poorly conceived nature of most 
college judicial systems, in which decisions are often made by those ill-educated in harass-
ment law and/or those favoring an interpretation of that law far broader than that estab-
lished in the courts. The problems of vagueness and overbreadth has been well-
documented by Professors Volokh and Browne. See Volokh, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 1812 
(cited in note 15); Browne, 52 Ohio St. L.J. at 502-03 (cited in note 15); Volokh, 90 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. at 1012-17 (cited in note 15). Professor Volokh's enumeration in the last-cited 
article demonstrates that the further development of harassment law has not diminished 
the vagueness problem. 
39. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 125-26 (cited in note 4). 
40. Id. at 236-27, 131-33. 
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state must tolerate what most of its citizens deem to be unfair" in 
order to protect associational values.4t Got that? 
Things get no clearer when Greenawalt discusses specifics. 
The Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan,42 which upheld Depart-
ment of Health regulations precluding doctors who received fed-
eral funding for family planning services from advising patients 
of abortion services, threatened the "community" of doctor and 
patient.43 (Greenawalt does not mention the community of those 
who do not want their money spent to support abortions.) 
Although veterans may be a "community," their special interest 
in not having flags burned "should have little constitutional 
weight." Most colleges and workplaces are not communities in a 
"narrow" sense and, in any event, Greenawalt concedes that the 
arguments about communities do not provide simple answers 
when discussing abusive speech since it is not altogether clear 
that rules against such speech really benefit all or most minority 
groups, because individual members of such groups have been 
known to employ "abusive" speech to make their points.44 
What Greenawalt does not discuss at all is the competence 
of the judiciary to analyze arguments about "communities." 
Surely, the courts can accept rational value-judgments made by 
other branches about communities. But it is less than clear that 
when an argument about, for example, the "community" of doc-
tor and patient has been given no weight by a co-equal branch of 
government, that the judiciary should step in to make that argu-
ment. The judiciary does have some institutional competence, 
we hope, in understanding individual rights and interpreting the 
provisions of positive law which give substance to those individ-
ual rights. But it frequently has trouble doing even this, and 
Greenawalt's discussion of "communities" did not convince me 
that it is time for judges to branch out. 
* * * 
The criticisms set forth in this review aside, Professor Green-
awalt has written a readable, succinct book on the First Amend-
ment issues that are of most concern to Americans today. Even 
where I disagreed with, or could not penetrate, his analysis, I 
found his discussion of relevant cases informative and enlighten-
ing, and his ability to tie together seemingly disparate strands of 
41. Id. 
42. 500 u.s. 173, 198-200 (1991). 
43. Greenawalt, Fighting Words at 143-46 (cited in note 4). 
44. Id. 
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First Amendment jurisprudence impressive. I plan to keep it 
handy as a ready reference. 
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE. 
By Martin Redish.! New York: Oxford University Press. 
1995. Pp. 229. Hardcover, $39.95. 
Richard W. Murphyz 
In The Constitution as Political Structure, Professor Martin 
Redish argues that the Supreme Court has ignored or mangled 
the Constitution's federalism and separation-of-powers require-
ments. He suggests that, contrary to the suggestions of some 
scholars, the Supreme Court has a duty to vigorously and consist-
ently enforce these provisions for at least two reasons. First, the 
Court should enforce them because they are in the Constitution. 
If one values rule of law (and Professor Redish obviously does), 
then one should enforce the whole Constitution-it's cheating to 
pick favorite provisions. Second, he argues that the Constitu-
tion's structural provisions are a great bulwark against tyranny. 
To ignore them is to risk sliding down the slippery slope to loss of 
liberty. 
In light of these reasons, Professor Redish contends the 
Supreme Court should: put real limits on the reach of Congress's 
Commerce Clause power (strongly foreshadowing the majority 
opinion of United States v. Lopez3) (p. 49-61); demolish the 
(mythical?) Dormant Commerce Clause (p. 63-98); abandon 
functionalist approaches to separation-of-powers in favor of a 
"pragmatic formalist" approach (p. 99-134); and adopt a "polit-
ical commitment" approach that would put teeth (though, it 
turns out, not sharp ones) into the doctrine that the legislature 
cannot delegate legislative power (p. 135-61). Along the way, 
Professor Redish discusses the normative political theories that 
underlie the Constitution's structural provisions and offers quick 
critiques of competing scholarly views concerning their 
interpretation. 
This book's greatest strength is its often devastating critique 
of the Court's federalism jurisprudence. Professor Redish per-
1. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
2. Law Clerk to the Honorable Stephen S. Trott, 9th Circuit; J.D. suma cum laude 
University of Minnesota Law School, 1995; B.A. Carleton College, 1987. 
3. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
